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EVACUATION CRITERIA AFTER A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: 
A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE
Richard Wilson  Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics (emeritus), Harvard
University
 In any decision involving radiation a risk-risk or risk-benefit comparison should be
done. This can be either explicit or implicit. When the adverse effect of an alternate
action is less than the planned action, such as medical use of X rays or nuclear power in
ordinary operation, the comparison is simple. But in this paper I argue that with the situ-
ation faced by the Japanese in Fukushima, the assumption that the risk of an alternate
action is small is false. The risks of unnecessary evacuation exceeded the risk of radiation
cancers hypothetically produced by staying in place. This was not realized by those that
had to make a decision within hours. This realization suggests important changes, world-
wide, in the guidelines for radiation protection in accident situations.
Key words: Evacuation, Nuclear, accident, radiation, risk.
BACKGROUND
There is an extraordinary large literature on the effects of radiation
on health but surprisingly little on the effect on public health of an acci-
dent or of deliberate sabotage or terrorist attack. For example there is no
discussion at all in the radiation protection handbook in Harvard
University (Harvard 2002). Yet a proper understanding is crucially impor-
tant for public acceptance of nuclear technologies. In this paper I exam-
ine some historical experience of radiation use and various accidents to
show that the recommendations are overly complex and ignore problems
other than radiation. I summarize from the enormous data pool at our
disposal the facts that I consider to be important. The reaction to the
Fukushima accident was incorrect and detrimental to sound public
health. In this I use the perspective of a Risk-Benefit analyst who con-
stantly compares the risks of an action (or inaction) with risks of alterna-
tive actions or inactions.
MEDICAL USE OF X RAYS
Very soon after Roentgen’s discovery of X rays in 1895, physicians
used them for diagnostic purposes. Although very early it was realized
that they caused skin and other lesions, the fantastic ability to see within
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the body was so important that physicians correctly argued that the ben-
efits of the x ray use overshadowed any harm. But this only addressed one
part of the risk-benefit calculation. Others, physicists in particular, point-
ed out that the same benefit could be achieved with far less harm by more
careful use of shielding, more sensitive film and so forth.
In the 1920s there was more interest in controlling the use of radia-
tion. In 1927 the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP) was formed. This is a non governmental body but most govern-
ments heed its recommendations. But the advice of ICRP and physicists
was not fully heeded till about 1970. In l961 for example I had an (unnec-
essary) chest X ray at Stanford University and measured my dose. About
1 rem. Now the same X ray would take 7 mrem. But a CAT scan today is
nearly 1 rem (0.1 Sv). In addition the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) realized that there is a risk posed by a number of radioac-
tive materials in the environment. I found that the justification for the
regulations they proposed was not well argued and in my public com-
ments I proposed a justification based upon the health effects data
(Wilson 2000a,b).
HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI: DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACUTE
PROBLEMS AND CHRONIC PROBLEMS
The studies find a crucial distinction between the results of radiation
exposure in a short period (integrated over a week or two) and the acute
effects that it causes, and radiation over a long period of a few years and
the chronic effects that causes. The acute effect of Acute Radiation
Sickness starts with a reduction in white blood cell counts and can then
lead to tissue damage. It is generally accepted that this occurs at radiation
levels above 100 rems (1 Sv) with an LD50 (least dose at which 50% of
people die) if 400 rems (4 Sv), (formerly believed to be 250 rems) which
can be extended to 500 rems (5 Sv) by a blood transfusion. The first
major example of a death from Acute Radiation Sickness was Dr Harry
Daghlian who was exposed on 21 August 1945 in a nuclear criticality acci-
dent and died some days later. It is not always realized that prompt evac-
uation is only needed to avoid Acute Radiation Sickness (sometimes
Acute Radiation Syndrome) (CDC 2011).
Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide the data from which effects of radi-
ation are usually determined. As occurs with all chronic effects, they are
determined at a high radiation level and a model is used to describe what
happens at the lower level. A discussion of the underlying toxicology and
the models it suggests was made in 1980 (NCRP 1980). But the usual
(conservative) model suggests low dose linearity. This comes from the
realization that if a medical outcome of a pollutant or action is indistin-
guishable from one that occurs naturally, any addition to natural inci-
dence is proportional to the dose at low doses (Crump et al. 1976; Guess
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et al. 1977; Crawford and Wilson 1996). Indeed this is also a consequence
of the usual application of the multistage theory of cancer as described
over 50 years ago (Armitage and Doll 1954). Scientists tend now to rec-
ognize a more general statement: Understanding effects at low doses can-
not be separated from a general understanding of what causes the “nat-
ural” levels of cancer. It is vitally important for perspective to realize that
this argument also applies to cancers caused by chemical pollutants also,
and even to lung problems caused by air pollution – a fact not realized by
most of the public and not incorporated into regulations (Crawford and
Wilson 1996).
But there are assumptions and approximations. In the justification I
used the word “indistinguishable”. They must be biologically indistin-
guishable and not merely that a pathologist cannot distinguish. There is
only one paper to my knowledge on this fundamental point. Cancers that
occur after radiation therapy have a different DNA structure (Le Beau et
al. 1986). Unfortunately there seems to be no interest in exploring this
further either for radiation cancers or chemically produced cancers. The
coefficient of the linear term is determined from data at high doses. Also
the dose in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was over a short period and it is
probable that doses over a long period produce smaller effects. There are
animal studies that suggest a factor between 2 and 10 but only two data
sets. The occupational doses at Ozerk in 1948 as the Russians were rush-
ing to make a bomb before the “wicked Americans” killed them,
(Shlyakhter and Wilson 1991; Shilnikova et al. 2003) and the Russians
exposed at Techa River (Burmistrov, et al. 2000; Krestinina et al. 2005),
after the waste pond overflowed. A detailed discussion of how toxicolo-
gists considered other dose response models can be found in an NCRP
report (NCRP 1980) and in an ICRP report (ICRP 1990).
According to the above theoretical model, if someone gets a dose just
below the LD50 he can still get chronic problems of which the most
important is cancer. At an integrated dose of 200 rems there is a 10-20%
increase in cancer probability. This depends upon a dose integrated over
a long time - of the order of years. It can therefore rise well above 200
rems without causing Acute Radiation Sickness. The natural incidence of
fatal cancers is about 20% so that no one who gets less than 100 rems will
double his natural incidence and he cannot rightly claim that it is “more
likely than not” that his cancer is due to radiation. Low dose linearity was
used in the BEIR VII report to the US National Academy of
Sciences/National Research Council (NRC 2006). Here I simplify their
Table 1 as my Table 1. At 100 milliSievert, 0.1 Sv or 10 rems the increase
in fatal cancer probability is 4% or 20% of the natural fatal cancer rate.
The number of digits in each entry is high but they are not significant.
Alas there is no easily available table where age is broken out.
R. Wilson
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The radionuclides that are produced by nuclear fission are well
known, as are their melting points and boiling points. A listing can be
found, for example in Table 2 of the report of a study Severe Accidents at
Nuclear Power Plants that was carried out for the American Physical
Society (Wilson et al. 1985) reproduced here as Table 2. Most of the
entries in this table are barely relevant to this argument. But I call atten-
tion to the isotopes of iodine and of cesium. The former is normally
gaseous and is easily released and the latter, although normally solid, is
soon evaporated in an accident. Only in the high temperature of a
nuclear explosion would it be likely to emit large quantities of strontium,
uranium or plutonium. Cesium unlike these chemicals, does not stay in
the body and irradiates it roughly uniformly which simplifies the under-
standing. The last column of this table tells us the amount in the first 7
days after an accident. Unfortunately, although reporting on avoiding
nuclear accidents, that committee did not explain how this table should
be used in practice.
NUCLEAR POWER - NORMAL OPERATION
Physicists and engineers have for decades been urging careful use of
radioactive materials. A modern nuclear power station emits very little
radioactivity. Indeed it is often stated (correctly) that a coal fired power
station in its particulate emissions emits more. Also the exposure to the
plant workers can be kept low without sacrificing performance. Health
physicists have set standards which are low and can be met with little cost.
The benefit of a low radiation exposure is not limited by a high cost to
the consumer of electricity. This leads to a very simple risk benefit calcu-
lation. Likewise the risk benefit calculation for laboratory use of radioac-
tive materials is governed by such a simple risk benefit calculation with a
reduction to a level “As Low as Reasonably Achievable” (ALARA) first
Evacuation Criteria after a Nuclear Accident
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TABLE 1. The table shows the estimated number of cancer and deaths calculated to result in
100,000 persons (with an age distribution similar to that of the entire U.S. population) exposed to
100 mSv (10 Rems). The estimates are accompanied by 95% subjective confidence intervals shown
in parentheses that reflect the most important uncertainty sources including statistical variations,
uncertainty in adjusting risk for exposure at low dosed and dose rates, and uncertainty in the
method of transporting data from a Japanese to a U.S. population. For comparison, the number of
calculated deaths in the absence of exposure is listed in Table 1; BEIR VII (NRC 2006). 
All Solid Cancer Leukemia
Males Females Males Females
Excess deaths from exposure 
to 100 mSv (10 Rems) 410 (200-830) 610 (300-1200) 70 (20-220) 50 (10-190)
Number of deaths in the absence 
of exposure 22,100 17,500 710 530
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defined numerically by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1975 to
cost less than $1000 per man rem (NRC 1975a, b) (This was upgraded
recently both for inflation and political correctness to $20 per person
Sievert). NCRPM also suggested a number 100 times smaller for occupa-
tional doses.
But when the situation in a power plant is not normal all changes.
The habits, rules, customs about radiation exposure should change
accordingly and the change should be automatic and instantaneous and
therefore prepared in advance. Advance preparation would have avoided
a problem stated in about 1979 by John Dunster when head of the UK
Health and Safety Executive; “There is no politician who would not pre-
fer a dead body to a frightened voter”. There was obviously no advanced
preparation at Fukushima. The need to balance risks is similar to the
physicians’ situation in 1900-1970.
R. Wilson
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TABLE 2. Radioactive inventories and whole-body dose conversion factors (3200 MWt_PWR)
(Table II.B.3; APS 1985). 
Shutdown Cloud Inhalation, κi Ground
Half-life inventory Dc/χo (rem/Ci inhaled) Dg/S
Radionuclides t1/2 (days) (10
6 Ci) (rem m3/Ci s) (0–50 yr) (rem m2/Ci)
Noble gases
Kr-85 3950.0 0.56 0.475 E – 03 0.310 E + 00
Kr-85m 0.183 24.0 0.364 E – 01 0.260 E + 00
Kr-87 0.0528 47 .0 0.181 E + 00 0.100 E + 01
Kr-88 0.117 68.0 0.467 E + 00 0.230 E + 01
Xe-133 5.28 170.0 0.906 E – 02 0.700 E + 00
X-135 0.384 34.0 0.567 E – 01 0.120 E + 01
Iodines
1-131 8.05 85.0 0.872 E – 01 0.600 E + 03 0.708 E + 03
1-132 0.0958 120.0 0.511 E + 00 0.700 E + 02 0.107 E + 03
1-133 0.875 170.0 0.154 E + 00 0.200 E + 03 0.311 E + 03
1-134 0.0366 190.0 0.533 E + 00 0.300 E + 02 0.414 E + 02
1-135 0.280 150.0 0.419 E + 00 0.150 E + 03 0.285 E + 03
Cesiums and rubidiums
Cs-134 750.0 7.5 0.350 E + 00 0.470 E + 05 0.369 E + 04
Cs-136 13.0 3.0 0.478 E + 00 0.590 E + 04 0.410 E + 04
Cs-137 11000.0 4.7 0.122 E + 00 0.360 E + 05 0.131 E + 04
Rb-86 18.7 0.026 0.207 E – 01 0.660 E + 04 0.185 E + 03
Telluriums and antimony
Te-127 0.391 5.9 0.936 E – 03 0.340 E + 02 0.813 E + 00
Te-127m 109.0 1.1 0.110 E – 02 0.240 E + 04 0.584 E + 02
Te-129 0.048 31.0 0.147 E – 01 0.980 E + 01 0.198 E + 01
Te-129m 0.340 53 0.783 E – 02 0.300 E + 04 0.246 E + 03
Te-131m 1.25 13.0 0.314 E + 00 0.550 E + 03 0.960 E + 03
Te-132 3.25 120.0 0.475 E – 01 0.150 E + 04 0.308 E + 04
Sb-I27 3.88 6.1 0.151 E + 00 0.790 E + 03 0.920 E + 03
Sb-129 0.179 33.0 0.268 E + 00 0.110 E + 03 0.104 E + 03
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WINDSCALE, THREE MILE ISLAND AND CHERNOBYL
There were three reactor accidents from which lessons can be
learned. At Windscale in 1957 a plutonium production reactor caught
fire and iodine was released. Short-lived radioactive iodine (131I with 10
day half life) can make the major immediate hazard with a well-known
chain. Iodine can fall to the ground and be eaten by cows where it con-
centrates in the milk and babies drink the milk and concentrate the
iodine in the thyroid. This has been realized for 60 years and at the
Windscale accident in the UK in 1957 the government impounded and
bought all milk downwind for a month (McGeoghegan et al. 2010;
Wakeford, 2007). (Curiously the cows produced twice as much as usual,
although this increase is not usually attributed to radiation!)
No one knows exactly how much iodine was ingested at Chernobyl,
but a lot. 2,000 children got thyroid cancer of which 20 have died. No one
need have got thyroid cancer if it were not for secrecy. There are anec-
dotes (which I believe) that a school teacher near Hohnichi (Belarus)
and an army general in eastern Ukraine were reprimanded by the KGB
for advising children not to drink milk for a month (the half life of the
iodine is 10 days or so) and thereby causing a panic (Shlyakhter and
Wilson 1992). This was, and is, far less likely to happen in an open socie-
ty in Japan.
There is disagreement about the effects of potassium iodide. If ingest-
ed before radioactive iodine exposure it can reduce the ingestion of the
radioactive substance. But there are suggestions that if taken after expo-
sure to radioactive iodine it can lock in the radioactive iodine already
taken. Moreover, there are other side effects particularly for pregnant
women so it is wise not to take it unnecessarily.
At Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 there was a partial meltdown but
mostly contained. I can find no report of what happened to the iodine,
but believe that it combined with water to form HI which was pumped out
of the containment into the turbine building where it stayed quietly on
the floor.
After Chernobyl in 1986 scientists confirmed that the important
releases for the long term effects are 134Cs (two year half life) and 137Cs
(30 year half life). The measurements of radioactivity deposition con-
firms that deposition and therefore emission of 90Sr and the transuranic
elements was much less, even though the initial explosion dispersed them
locally. The subsequent graphite fire must have reached thousands of
degrees and almost all the cesium was evaporated, and that the radiation
from the ground deposition is the important pathway with ingestion only
about 25%. Evacuation from Pripyat was delayed 36 hours and
Chistallogovka 3-4 days. This delay raised public criticism. But prompter
evacuation would not have changed the integrated dose much. Only at
Evacuation Criteria after a Nuclear Accident
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Chernobyl, and in the plant, did anyone get Acute Radiation Sickness. No
one in the general public did.
One important feature for perspective and public understanding is
that the effects on health of these low levels of radioactivity are calculated,
and not measured. The calculated number is too small to be directly meas-
ured. Indeed the number might be zero if the radiation cancers are not
identical with those occurring naturally or might even be less than 0 (ben-
eficial). This is described by the word hormesis. There is no hormesis for
those washed out to sea in the Tsunami. Those who wish to dramatize the
effect tend to stress the total number of calculated fatal cancers. Typical
numbers discussed are 4,000-8,000 in the Ukraine, Belarus and European
Russia countries and 20,000 worldwide. The latter is to be compared with
the billion or so naturally occurring cancers in the world in that time peri-
od. But when an accident has occurred, and in discussion about how to
manage its consequences, the dose to each individual is appropriate.
FUKUSHIMA: ADVERSE EFFECTS ON HEALTH OF DISLOCATION OR
EVACUATION
It has been noted in the medical community for many years that there
are stresses and problems associated with relocation that can lead by
themselves to adverse effects on public health. In 1975 I saw figures of a
5% increase in cancer probability. I note that in an accident situation this
would only be a calculated increase but in that sense is directly compara-
ble to any increase in cancer rate due to radiation. It is hard to find good
numbers and I merely refer to a recent review (Uscher-Pine 2009). She
opined (Uscher-Pine 2009): “Despite the frequency of post-disaster relo-
cation and evidence of its effect on psychological morbidity, there is a rel-
ative paucity of studies; the few examples in the literature reveal weak
study designs, inconsistent results, and inattention to physical health
impacts and the challenges facing vulnerable populations. Further
research guided by theory is needed to inform emergency preparedness
and recovery policy.”
In the 1980s Dr Crouch and I were interested in the comparison of
carcinogenic potency of animals and men. We looked at the unexposed
“control” rats and mice from the US National Toxicology program. The
rate of cancer varied many percent. For example we found that in some
experiments the lights in the cages were on continuously and these were
rodents with an elevated “control” rate. In the large study of 30,000 mice
at the National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR), the ED01 or
“Megamouse” study (Littlefield and Gaylor, 1985; SOT 1981) there was a
variation in response according to where the cages were. Those on the
top shelf got tumors later than those on lower shelves. I presume that is
because their stress was less. But what counts as stress for a mouse is
unclear.
R. Wilson
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Similarly stress from divorce and separation, or even merely lack of a
partner, has been blamed for a 15% increase in the probability of cancer
fatalities (Kravdal 2001). I take 5% increase in cancer probability from
relocation as a reasonable “lower limit” to the increase of cancer with the
stress of evacuation.
The “official” Kemeny report (Kemeny et al. 1979) after the TMI acci-
dent stated (inter alia): “We conclude that the most serious health effect
of the accident (for any reason) was severe mental stress, which was short-
lived. The highest levels of distress were found among those living within
five miles of Three Miles Island and in families with preschool children.”
Anecdotes in Japanese media have noted unexpected deaths in the
elderly who have been evacuated. Significant numbers of the elderly in
shelters have died unexpectedly. Maybe the calorie intake is below star-
vation level and not all have three meals a day. Lack of hot food, running
water, crowding, poor toilet facilities and lack of water for cleaning peo-
ple and locations, lack of fuel and lack of hospitals to accept admissions,
ambulances or medical services except what appear to be medical per-
sonnel who are themselves local victims. Yet there is no indication that
these possibilities were considered by those ordering an evacuation! A
simple calculation shows that this can far exceed any benefit evacuation
may bring. A recent unconfirmed and therefore anecdotal news report
that 300 people have died from the Fukushima accident from non-radia-
tion causes in two townships emphasizes the possible problems.
DOSES FROM FUKUSHIMA
Armed with this information I looked at the measurements from
Fukushima Daiichi. I first looked at the data on the radiation spike meas-
ured at the gate of the Fukushima complex and integrated it (Fig. 1)
(GRS 2011). The releases on Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday were
not serious. Indeed, associated with these early releases was a publicly
shown photograph of the explosion showing that the wind was blowing
out to sea. This by itself suggests that attention be given to careful timing
of gaseous releases. The big doses were on Tuesday, 15 March 2011 and
Wednesday, 16 March 2011. The spikes were probably doses from noble
gases. The integrated dose was large enough for concern - 0.02 Sv (or 2
rems). But even this is less than one year of normal occupational dose
and it should not have prevented a radiation worker from going to or
being near the plant. Indeed the report to International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA 2011) states that the average for all power plant workers as
of 23 May 2011 was only 7.7 mSv or 770 mrems, which is about the
amount of a CAT scan.
Starting on Thursday, 16 March 2011 the reactors and the spent fuel
pools were being cooled by seawater, and there has been no comparable
release since that time. Taking the usual decay of 134Cs and 137Cs into
Evacuation Criteria after a Nuclear Accident
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account one would expect an immediate drop, and my estimate would be
for about 0.06 Sv (6 rems) at the main gate for the first year and falling
more slowly thereafter. At three miles (5 km) this would be down a factor
of 10. Although the details of who did what and why are confused, a fair
independent source of information is available (INPO 2011)
I next looked at doses in the various other locations noted in the map
of Fig. 2 They were listed by the Japanese Atomic Industrial Forum but
the plots of the doses at these locations (Figs. 3 and 4) come from MEXT
(2011) The newspapers emphasized the doses in the Ibaraki region on
the way to Tokyo. The abscissa in that plot is µSv per hour. But the dose
seems much smaller when the doses in the Ibaraki prefecture are plotted
with a different abscissa and ordinate (Fig. 5). One µSv per hour, kept up
for a year, would give 8,760 µSv, or 8.76 mSv or 876 mrems. What does this
mean?
Many actions can give anyone a dose of 876 mrems:
• A single chest X ray in a major hospital as late as 1960.
• A CAT scan today.
• Seven months allowable occupational dose.
• 1/5 of what a Chernobyl clean up worker (liquidator) got.
• 1/100 of an astronaut’s allowed dose.
• About the dose I got in 1991 from a day at Chernobyl mostly from in-
side the sarcophagus.
Any serious student should evaluate his own lifetime dose for com-
parison. I have been officially a “radiation worker” since 1946. Yet my inte-
grated dose is almost all due to medical X rays – and I have no record of
R. Wilson
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FIG. 1. Dose rates measured at main gate of Fukushima Daiichi (Figure 1; GRS 2011). 
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these for the first 20 years and even now I have to keep the record myself.
The American Nuclear Society has a website which enables a good esti-
mate to be made online (ANS 2011). Ideally there would be such a pro-
gram with the fatal cancer rates at different ages.
In the last year I received 2.4 rems (0.02 Sv). I believe it is absurd to
evacuate to avoid this small a dose. Certainly evacuation should not be
mandatory. Of course if we go further and consider age, evacuating an 85
year old for anything except Acute Radiation Sickness is really stupid. The
graphs (Fig. 2, 3 and 4) from MEXT (2011) of radiation releases suggest
Evacuation Criteria after a Nuclear Accident
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FIG. 2. Locations where Radiation Exposure was measured around Fukushima Daiichi NPS (MEXT
2011). 
FIG. 3. Dose rate vs. time in Ibaraki prefecture (MEXT 2011). 
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that no one in the Tochiki or Ibaraki prefectures should be concerned
but naturally they will be interested.
For the area NW of the plant, the best description of the doses comes
from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science & Technology
(MEXT 2011) in Japan.
Their map (Fig. 6) shows that the major deposition was to the NW of
the plant toward Fukushima itself. MEXT integrated the doses to March
2012 using the usual model, giving the results shown in Fig. 6 and Table 3.
The integrated doses are in milliSievert (mSv). The high-integrated doses
are all in the Furaha County. Only one is higher than 0.2 Sv (20 rems)
integrated to March 2012. These are for continued occupancy in the
open. It can clearly be reduced by being indoors and by avoiding high
dose hot spots. The lack of important doses in the south and southwest is
clearly apparent.
R. Wilson
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FIG. 4. Dose rate vs. Time in Fukushima prefecture (MEXT 2011). 
FIG. 5. Dose rate vs. time in Ibaraki prefecture with different ordinate and abscissa. 
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For comparison 20 rems was the official dose allowed for the “liq-
uidators” (clean up workers) after Chernobyl. According to the studies of
effects of radiation (Table 1) this can add 1% or so to cancer probability.
This is well below the variation in natural cancer incidence (up to 30%)
from unknown causes.
There is no indication of any large deposition of either strontium or
transuranic elements, which evaporate at a higher temperature, suggest-
ing that the internal deposition by these elements can be ignored. From
this MEXT used a theory to estimate the integrated dose to March 2011
shown in Table 3.
Evacuation Criteria after a Nuclear Accident
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FIG. 6. Integrated radiation dose map of the area NW of the plant, in April 2011 (MEXT 2011). 
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THE EVACUATION DECISION
The question the Japanese faced was whether and how much to evac-
uate. This decision had to be made within hours. They had not thought
in advance. Then they panicked. It is unclear whether the evacuation was
ordered by the government or merely suggested. But it was without analy-
sis. But this is clearly understandable and forgivable given the history of
radiation effects in Japan and the failure of the world community to pro-
vide guidance. Indeed for 30 years the world community has set guide-
lines which, I argue, are stupid.
They should have asked the questions:
• Is there an immediate reason to evacuate to avoid Acute Radiation Sick-
ness? The measured doses give the answer NO. Indeed a subsequent in-
dependent report by INPO (2011) shows that the highest exposed
worker received a dose 1/6 of the LD50.
• Would there be an appreciable increase in long term radiation dose by
waiting a few days to analyze? Again the realization that Cesium was the
problem would demand the answer NO.
• In retrospect was it sensible to evacuate people beyond three miles
from the reactor, bearing in mind the competitive risks? I submit that
here again the answer is NO.
R. Wilson
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TABLE 3. Measurements at some specific locations with high exposures (MEXT 2011) 
Estimates of 
Estimates Latest Integrated Dose 
of Integrated Readings as of 
Location Dose (Average) March 11, 2012
Name of Town Direction Distance MSv mSv/h mSv
Akogi Kunugidaira, Northwest 24km 68.2 0.0374 224.9
Futaba County
Akogi, Ishigoya, Northwest 30km 37.1 0.0158 103.1
Namie Town, 
Futaba County
Akogi Teshichiro, Northwest 31km 32.9 0.0163 101.0
Namie Town, 
Futaba County
Onami Takinoiri, Northwest 56km 3.8 0.0018 11.4
Fukushima City
Aza Kitaaramaki, South 31km 1.0 0.0002 1.6
Hisanohama Town, 
Iwaki City
Takahagi, South-Southwest 36km 0.6 0.0002 1.4
Ogawa Town, 
Iwaki City
13
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• Would it have been wise to inform everyone and prepare for a volun-
tarily evacuation for those who wished it, which preparation could
avoid the chaos that occurred in New Orleans after Katrina? Here the
answer is definitely YES.
• Is there an adverse effect on health in evacuation? Here the answer is
definitely YES although such effects are often ignored.
The answers at the end of each question are my own personal
answers. I submit that the whole world nuclear power and safety commu-
nity, including semi-political agencies like IAEA and the politicians them-
selves ponder the above.
American friends of the Japanese people should ask themselves the
following questions:
• What is the role of friends who believe they are experts?
• Careful analysis along the lines of the early part of this report?
• Off the cuff remarks at a Senate budget hearing?
Dr Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, gave the following testimony Jaczko to the US Congress on
17 March 2011: “Recently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
made a recommendation that based upon the available information that
we have, that for a comparable situation in the United States, we would
recommend an evacuation to a much larger radius than has been cur-
rently been provided in Japan. As a result of this recommendation, the
ambassador in Japan has issued a statement to American citizens that we
believe it is appropriate to evacuate to a larger distance up to approxi-
mately 50 miles.” (Jaczko 2011)
This was repeated by President Obama, on Thursday, 17 March 2011,
with the following news release: “President Obama made remarks from
the White House Rose Garden on the nuclear crisis in Japan shortly after
paying an unannounced visit to the Japanese Embassy. After expressing
condolences to the Japanese people, the president confirmed calling for
an evacuation of U.S. citizens within a 50 mile radius of the reactors in
northeastern Japan.” (Obama 2011)
These were unfortunate. I so stated in a formal fax to Dr Jaczko as
soon as I saw the transcript but got no response I have been told that
Jaczko was merely following an NRC rule: Keep the dose less than 500
mrems in the immediate accident and < 2 rems over the first year. I argue
that the events at Fukushima demonstrate clearly how stupid, and coun-
terproductive to public health, that rule is, and it becomes a matter of
urgency to modify it.
Evacuation Criteria after a Nuclear Accident
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RADIATION ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
At Fukushima there was no proper management of radiation doses
immediately the reactor situation was out of control (immediately after
the tsunami). There seems to have been no realization in Japan, and
probably no realization anywhere else, of the fact that radiation manage-
ment after an accident should, even must, must differ from radiation
management immediately before the accident.
Before TMI (before 1980) it was generally accepted that there were
certain radiation levels that should not be exceeded. After TMI, and even
more after Chernobyl the recommended levels were reduced. While it
makes some sense to keep, for example, to 5 rems/yr (0.05 Sv/ yr) for a
nuclear power worker in ordinary operation it is, I believe desirable to
return to the higher figures as soon as an accident goes beyond normal
operation. Thus it should be allowed for a worker to plan for 20 rems (0.2
Sv) for the whole accident, and indeed at Chernobyl 100,000 or more
workers got this dose of 20 rems as “liquidators” (clean up workers). A
one time dose of 80 rems (0.8 Sv) was allowed for an astronaut and for a
rare individual “to save lives” 80 rems was allowed. It is reported that at
Fukushima workers were pulled off the job in Sunday and Monday in the
Fukushima accident before the Japanese belatedly restored the pre-1980
levels. This probably delayed a proper technical response to the accident.
Although at all ages it is important to keep the radiation dose below that
giving Acute Radiation Sickness, full use of older workers, particularly vol-
unteers, should be taken. A person over 70 years old with a high accu-
mulated radiation dose will develop cancer only after 20 years and then it
is the least of his worries. (e.g. Harding et al. 2011)
It is unclear whether my recommendation of an immediate reversion
to the pre-1980 radiation safety levels would have enabled the Tokyo
Electric Power Company (TEPCO) to control the reactors any better in
the crucial first day. I think they would and that is implied in INPO
(2011).
A LESSER ISSUE: RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEDIA.
News media have been the principal method of communicating with
the public, and even with experts. At Three Mile Island, at Chernobyl and
at the Tokyo incident the US media failed miserably and forgot their duty.
Not one newspaper, nor Associate Press quoted the precise NRC press
releases. None of the major newspapers even got the units correct. The
Internet has improved this. Experts can find information directly. But
there is still a responsibility to inform the public, and in particular to
explain what the radiation dose levels mean, in terms of public health
and to discuss the harrowing decisions those on the spot must make. In
that I find the media lacking.
R. Wilson
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I next turn to accident prevention. The aim is to prevent the unde-
sirable fission products ever coming into contact with the public. There
are several barriers:
1. The fuel is in zirconium pellets which are in a zirconium tube. Al-
though design criteria allowed 0.1% of these tubes to leak, probably
none did before the accident.
2. If the first barrier fails, there is a pressure vessel which should hold
them.
3. If the pressure vessel fails there is a containment vessel.
But, we must emphasize the importance of keeping barrier one intact
if possible. Of course it is always important to stop an untoward event as
early in the chain as possible. It is especially important because failure
here makes it harder to control. In a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) one
can be close to the reactor in operation as I personally have been - one is
shielded by the water in the pressure vessel. Once the first barrier fails,
doses are higher outside the pressure vessel increasing radiation doses for
a worker and making subsequent fixes harder.
MAN REMS (PERSON-SIEVERT) OR REMS MAN-1 (SV PERSON-1)?
In the preceding paragraphs I have emphasized the dose per person
(rems man-1 or Sv per person) because that matches the decisions that I
was discussing. Rosalyn Yalow, who won the Nobel Prize in medicine for
radioimmunioassays repeatedly emphasized this in her lectures
“Radioactivity in the Service of Man”. But radiation protection experts
frequently calculate the collective dose in Man-rems (or Person-Sieverts)
because when using a linear dose response relationship and multiplying
by the appropriate slope (coefficient) this gives the total societal impact.
I do this for the next section on comparing disasters and also take a more
optimistic slope allowing for a dose rate reduction factor.
COMPARISON TO OTHER WORLD DISASTERS
The effects of evacuation or not evacuating should be compared to
15,000 dead, and 15,000 missing direct, measurable and definite “dead
bodies” from other earthquake and tsunami problems (Table 4).
My rough guess is that one can calculate (but never measure) 500
fatal cancers from radiation from Fukushima (originally my incorrect pre-
diction was close to zero. But it could be zero or even slightly negative.).
However Richard Garwin has recently calculated a figure of 5000 world-
wide.
I emphasize that the calculated cancers are within the fluctuations of
the natural cancer numbers and cannot ever be directly measured.
Evacuation Criteria after a Nuclear Accident
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MY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STUDY OF RADIATION EMERGENCIES
I have argued since 1980 that there should be detailed study of a num-
ber of fundamental issues. (These should be for other pollutant sub-
stances and actions also.)
1. Before 1980 the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission asked for an
“Emergency Planning Zone” (not an evacuation zone) of 10 miles di-
ameter. After TMI this became an “evacuation zone” without the de-
tailed discussion such a decision requires. I, personally, was opposed
to this implication for automatic evacuation, and testified to the On-
tario Royal Commission and others that it was a mistake. I strongly
urge the International Community to reexamine this requirement.
2. One should similarly reconsider the requirements for reentry into an
area with higher than usual radiation levels after an accident.
3. Are cancers caused by radiation truly indistinguishable from natural-
ly occurring cancers? Or is it just that a pathologist cannot distin-
guish? (use DNA analysis). Even if this were only done for another
pollutant such as arsenic there would be an increased understanding
of low dose effects.
4. What is the effect of dose rate? (I urge a careful look at such data as
the Techa River and the Mayak workers)
5. What is the effect of disaster stress on cancer? In people? In animals?
6. Can one design a fuel cladding which does not oxidize and therefore
does not release both hydrogen and energy?
7. Scientists must continually remind the public and public policy spe-
cialists about the effects and lack of effects about radiation. 40 years
ago as nuclear power began to enter the world energy system, anti-nu-
clear activists took the stage. Their dramatic assertions of utter disas-
R. Wilson
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TABLE 4. Estimated Number of Deaths Compared to Other World Disasters. 
Cause and Event Estimated Number of Deaths
Fatal Cancers from Natural Background Exposures 1 10,000,000 per year
300,000,000 in average half lifetime
Arsenic Poisoning in Bangladesh 2 500,000 from exposures 1970 to date
Earthquake in Haiti 200,000
Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan 3 30,000
Fatal Cancers from Chernobyl in the Next 60 years 4 7,500 in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine
20,000 – 30,000 worldwide
Fatal Cancer from Three Mile Island 5 0.7 total
Adverse Health Effects Due to the Evacuation Around Fukushima 5,000 upwards
1 Including medical exposures; on a worldwide basis.
2 Assuming everyone have pure water.
3 Prompt deaths.
4 Calculated excluding effects of stress.
5 Calculated for the Kemeny Commission.
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ter tend to dominate the media. It is important to publish detailed
refutations of their extreme arguments. Ideally newspapers would do
this but they do not. An example is the paper by Shihab-Eldin et al.
(1992).
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The need to reconsider the change the procedure in a risk analysis
for the consequences of a serious accident after it has taken place should
clearly be part of the training of every person operating a nuclear power
reactor and health physicists on duty. But there is another implication.
The world is concerned about possible release of a dirty bomb or radioac-
tive dispersal device (RDD) or even a nuclear bomb itself by a terrorist,
whether a state actor or non state actor. If it can be made clear to the pub-
lic, including potential terrorists, that the effects of radiation release can
be limited, such a procedure and target can be less attractive to a terror-
ist. It is also vital that every group of first responders have AT LEAST one
person who understands radiation and is not afraid of entering a high
radiation area.
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